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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
William Joseph Hale,

the jury verdict ﬁnding

II,

him

appeals from the judgment and conviction entered upon

guilty 0f possession of

hydrocodone, and possession ofdrug paraphernalia.
court’s denial 0f his

Statement

Of The

motion

Facts

p. 14,

And Course Of The Proceedings
p.m., Ofﬁcer Sessions

was on routine

patrol in

Garden City

a car with a single occupant parked in a closed business parking

lot.

(Tr.,

L.13 — p.15, L.2. 1) Ofﬁcer Sessions observed that the car did not have license plates

afﬁxed as

it

exited the parking

registration. (TL, p.16,

at

On appeal, Hale challenges the district

to suppress.

At approximately 9:00

When he noticed

methamphetamine, possession of

lot.

(TL, p.16, Ls.18-23.)

He

also did not see a temporary

L.24 — p.17, L.2.) Based on those observations, he stopped the car

approximately 9:04 p.m.

(R., p.124;

TL, p.17, Ls.3-6.)

Ofﬁcer Sessions made contact with the driver who handed Ofﬁcer Sessions
driver’s license.

as the driver.

been stopped.
was, in

fact,

(R., p.124.)

Using the driver’s

license,

Ofﬁcer Sessions identiﬁed Hale

(TL, p.17, Ls.1 1-18.) Ofﬁcer Sessions then explained t0 Hale
(R., p. 124.)

The

he had

In response, Hale pointed t0 a temporary registration tag that

his ﬂashlight in that direction

and saw the temporary permit

he had not been able to see beforehand due t0 the window’s

1

Why

displayed in the upper right corner 0f the car’s tinted rear Window. (R., p. 124.)

Ofﬁcer Sessions shined

nighttime.

his

(R., p.124; T11, p.18,

1

and the

fact that

L.25 — p.19, L.3; p.21, L.24 — p.22, L.11.)

transcripts are contained in ten separate

Will only cite t0 the ﬁrst, titled

tint

PDF

was

Before

ﬁles. Like the Appellant, the state

201801 18-145943 Hale.pdf.
1

it

that

inspecting the permit, Ofﬁcer Sessions requested the vehicle’s registration and proof of

insurance.

borrowed the car from

Garden

City.

document

Hale told the ofﬁcer that he had

(R., p.124; Tr., p.18, Ls.9-15; State’s EX. 1.)

its

actual

(R., p.124;

in the glove

owner Who he claimed was a

Tr., p.19,

Hale eventually found a registration

Ls.4-12.)

compartment and handed

friend that lived nearby in

it

t0

Ofﬁcer Sessions.

could not, however, locate or provide any proof of insurance for the vehicle. (R.,

At approximately 9:09

p.m.,

ﬁve minutes

Hale

(R., p. 124.)

after initiating the stop,

p. 124.)

Ofﬁcer Sessions

returned to his patrol vehicle With the registration document and Hale’s driver’s license.

(R., p.124; Tr., p.61, Ls.9-13.)

Ofﬁcer Sessions conducted

license, registration,

warrants checks using his dashboard computer. (R., p.124; Tr., p.22, L.12

—

and

p.23, L.18.)

While conducting the routine checks, Ofﬁcer Sessions asked a second ofﬁcer Who had
arrived

0n scene

t0 request the assistance

of a canine

unit.

(R., p.124; Tr., p.28, Ls.9-15.)

After “[o]nly a few minutes,” the routine checks revealed n0 concerns about the
validity of Hale’s license nor did they reveal

any outstanding warrants.

(R., pp.124-25.)

However, the registration check revealed a discrepancy between What Hale had told Ofﬁcer
Sessions about the car owner’s address and the address that
registration check. (R., p.125; Tr., p.24, Ls. 10-20.)

car’s

owner

lived in

Garden

(Tr., p.78,

the ofﬁcer’s

Hale had told Ofﬁcer Sessions that the

City, but the registration

owner’s address was in Boise.

was returned by

check showed that the registered

L.24 — p.25, L.2;

ﬂ

R., pp.124-25.)

Upon

discovering this discrepancy, Ofﬁcer Sessions contacted Hale a second time t0 verify

Who

owner knew he had possession 0f the

car,

the

and

owner was,

to verify Hale’s claim that the

to verify that the

p.25, Ls.4-12.)

owner had given Hale permission

to drive the car.

(R., p.125; Tr.,

Hale identiﬁed the car’s registered owner by name and provided the

owner’s phone number.

Ofﬁcer Sessions returned

At 9:14

After collecting this information,

(R., p.125; Tr., p.25, Ls.4-16.)

t0 his patrol vehicle. (R., p. 125.)

p.m., approximately ten minutes after the stop

was

initiated,

Ofﬁcer

Sessions began t0 generate a citation for failing t0 provide proof of insurance on his

dashboard computer.

also called the car’s registered

was

t0 drive the vehicle

At approximately 9:19

and

that the vehicle

was not

p.m., While Ofﬁcer Sessions

at the trafﬁc stop. (R., p. 125.)

to

The owner conﬁrmed that Hale

insured. (R., p. 125.)

telephone conversation with the car’s registered owner, an

deputy arrived

He

owner and asked Whether he had given Hale permission

drive the car and whether the car

had permission

But, he did not complete the citation. (R., p.125.)

(R., p.125.)

insured. (R., p. 125.)

was

still

engaged in the

Ada County

Sheriff’s canine

The canine conducted a

free air sniff around

the stopped car and alerted at approximately 9:21 p.m., seventeen minutes after the stop

was

initiated

and just two minutes

Before he

knew

after arriving

that the canine

had

on scene.

alerted

on the

patrol car to initiate a third conversation With Hale.

conﬁrm

that the address

correct address

on the

0n Hale’s

driver’s license

failure to provide

(R., p. 125.)

car,

Ofﬁcer Sessions exited his

(R., p.125.)

was

The ofﬁcer wanted

correct so as t0 ensure he put a

proof 0f insurance

citation. (R., p.125.)

However,

before Ofﬁcer Sessions had a chance to speak With Hale the canine deputy informed
that the canine

had

alerted

on the

car.

uncovered a baggie 0f six Hydrocodone
pipe used t0 smoke methamphetamine.

placed Hale under

arrest.

(R., p.125.)

pills,

A

him

subsequent search 0f the car

a baggie of methamphetamine, and a glass

(R., p.125; Tr., p.35, Ls.14-25.)

(TL, p.35, Ls.5-13.)

to

The ofﬁcers

The

state

charged Hale with two felony counts 0f possession of a controlled

substance, LC. § 37-2732(c), one count possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A,

and a persistent Violator enhancement, LC.
to “suppress all

§ 19-25 14. (R., pp.37-38, 55-56.)

0f the contraband seized” during the trafﬁc

stop.

Hale moved

(R., pp.83-90.)

argued the “original trafﬁc stop was illegally extended for a dog

sniff.”

Hale

(R., p.90.)

Following a suppression hearing, the court took the matter under advisement and
subsequently issued an order denying the motion to suppress. (R., pp. 122-30.) Thereafter,
the case

was

set for jury trial.

The jury found Hale
Violator enhancement.

(R., p. 143.)

guilty

(R.,

0n

all

three counts,

and Hale admitted

pp.187-200, 203-15, 245.)

concurrent, uniﬁed eight-year sentences with

of possession of a controlled substance.

The

to the persistent

district

two and one-half years ﬁxed

(R., pp.267—70.)

court imposed

for each count

The court imposed twenty-ﬁve

days with twenty-ﬁve days credit for time served on the misdemeanor possession 0f drug
paraphernalia charge. (R., pp.267-70.) Hale timely appeals. (R., pp.272-75.)

ISSUE
Hale

states the issue

0n appeal

as:

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Hale’s motion t0 suppress because
Ofﬁcer Sessions unlawfully prolonged the trafﬁc stop t0 verify Mr. Hale’s
permission t0 drive the car?
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Hale
suppress?

failed to

show

that the district court erred in

denying his motion to

ARGUMENT
Hale Has Failed

t0

Show That The

District

Court Erred

When It Denied His Motion T0

Suppress

A.

Introduction

On

appeal, Hale asserts the district court erred

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

suppress.

When

it

According to Hale, Ofﬁcer Sessions unlawfully

extended the trafﬁc stop in Violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights by verifying

claim that he had the registered owner’s permission t0 drive the
p.8.) Hale’s

B.

argument

Standard

Hale’s

(Appellant’s brief,

car.

fails.

Of Review

The standard of review of a suppression motion
a motion to suppress

is

fact that are supported

916 P.2d 1284, 1286

is

bifurcated.

challenged, the appellate court accepts the

When a decision on

trial

court’s ﬁndings of

substantial evidence, but exercises free review of the application

by

0f constitutional principles t0 the
(Ct.

facts as found.

State V. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561,

App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power

to assess the

of witnesses, resolve factual conﬂicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual

credibility

inferences

denied his motion to

is

vested in the

trial court.

State V. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106,

897

P.2d 993, 997 (1995).

C.

Hale Has Failed
T0 Suppress

The

The

District Court’s Denial

Of His Motion

constitutionally acceptable length 0f a trafﬁc stop cannot be stated With

mathematical precision.

The

to Establish Error In

E

United States

tolerable duration of the trafﬁc-stop

Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008).

V.

is

“determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to

address the trafﬁc Violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.”

Rodriguez

V.

United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135

citation omitted).

“Because addressing the infraction

no longer than is necessary to
for the seizure ends

When

been completed.” State

2019)

McGraW, 163 Idaho

ﬂ

also State V.

(citing Illinois V. Caballes,

Ofﬁcers

may

is

”’

the purpose 0fthe stop,

Li (citation omitted).

it

may

‘last

“[A]uthority

the tasks related t0 the infraction are, or reasonably should have

V.

2018) (citations omitted);

effectuate that purpose.

1609, 1614 (2015) (internal

S. Ct.

736, 739, 418 P.3d 1245, 1248 (Ct. App.

_,

Idaho

Still,

543 U.S. 405, 407, 125

_ _
P.3d

S. Ct. 834,

(Ct.

App.

837 (2005)).

not prolong a trafﬁc stop beyond the time reasonably necessary to

complete their investigation into the trafﬁc Violation “absent the reasonable suspicion
ordinarily

S. Ct. at

demanded

to justify detaining

an individual.” Rodriggez, 575 U.S.

at

355, 135

1615. Nevertheless, “[b]eyond determining Whether to issue a trafﬁc ticket, an

ofﬁcer’s purpose during a trafﬁc stop

[]

may

also include conducting ordinary inquiries

incident t0 the trafﬁc stop.” State V. Renteria, 163 Idaho 545, 549, 415 P.3d 954, 958 (Ct.

App. 2018). “Typically, such inquiries involve checking the driver’s
whether there are outstanding warrants against the
registration

and proof of insurance.”

driver,

license, determining

and inspecting the automobile’s

Rodriggez, 575 U.S.

at

355, 135 S. Ct. at 1615.

Conducting these routine inquiries does not unlawfully extend the duration of the trafﬁc
stop because such ordinary inquiries “serve the

same

obj ective as enforcement ofthe trafﬁc

code: ensuring that vehicles 0n the road are operated safely and responsibly.” Rodriguez,

575 U.S.

at

The

355, 135 S. Ct. at 1615;
district court correctly

ﬂ m,

163 Idaho

at 549,

415 P.3d

at 958.

concluded that the short amount of time that Ofﬁcer

Sessions spent verifying Hale’s claim that he had the driver’s permission t0 drive the car

did not unlawfully extend the stop because

it

was

part of the ordinary inquiries incident t0

the trafﬁc stop.

Ofﬁcer Sessions had a reasonable and

articulable suspicion that

Hale was driving

the car in Violation 0f trafﬁc laws that require the display of license plates or a temporary

permit, but this initial suspicion

was

dispelled Within a

few minutes of the ofﬁcer

the stop. (R., pp. 123, 126.2) Before the initial suspicion

“reasonable and articulable suspicion—more than

was

that, to

initiating

dispelled, the ofﬁcer acquired

probable cause—that Hale was

driving the vehicle in Violation 0f LC. § 49-12320), Which requires drivers t0 have proof

0f insurance in their possession or inside
issue” identiﬁed

by the

district court

their vehicles at all times.” (R., p. 124.)

was

therefore whether

The “key

Ofﬁcer Sessions’s attempts

to

verify Hale’s claim that he had the registered owner’s permission to drive the car “justiﬁed

him in continuing Hale’s
shows the

seizure.” (R., p.176.) Application 0f the relevant legal standards

district court correctly

concluded

it

did.

Because conﬁrming the registered owner’s address and Hale’s permission
the car

was properly

the drug dog’s alert

incident t0 the trafﬁc stop, Hale’s nineteen-minute detention prior t0

was

constitutional.

that are “[t]ypica11y” included in

registration, insurance,

16 1 5. That

list is

t0 drive

Rodriguez enumerates several “ordinary inquiries”

an ofﬁcer’s mission during a trafﬁc stop: license,

and warrants checks. Rodriguez, 575 U.S.

at

355, 135 S. Ct. at

not exhaustive. Like other ordinary inquiries, verifying Hale’s claim that

he had permission t0 drive a car that was not registered to him ensures that vehicles 0n the
road are operated safely and responsibly.

2

Hale waived any challenge

t0 the initial basis for the trafﬁc stop. (Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

8

The

district court

found, “[O]n average, a person driving someone else’s vehicle

Without permission poses a greater risk of unsafe driving than either a person driving his

own

someone

vehicle 0r a person driving

the district court, the state

conclusion.

is

(ﬂ R., p.127.)

district court’s

conclusion

The Fourth

is

else’s car

With permission.”

unaware of any Idaho case law

(R., p.127.)

Like

that directly supports this

Notwithstanding the dearth of Idaho case law 0n point, the
correct

and supported by federal case law.

Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that verifying a

non-owner

claim that the registered owner gave them permission t0 drive a vehicle

is

driver’s

tantamount t0

other ordinary inquiries that typically occur in conjunction With a trafﬁc stop. In

Banh,

the defendant challenged the constitutionality of his routine trafﬁc stop seeking the

suppression 0f contraband that was discovered following the positive alert by a drug-

snifﬁng dog.

E Banh,

537 F.3d

The defendant argued

at 335.

that there

was n0

3”
his trafﬁc stop
justiﬁcation for law enforcement taking “‘over 30 minutes to complete

for running a red light,

detain

and

that ofﬁcers

him beyond the reasonable

had

6“

n0 independent justiﬁcation 0r reason

duration’ 0fthe lawful trafﬁc stop.”

I_d.,

537 F.3d

at

t0

335.

The court concluded, “[M]uch of Branch’s 30-minute detention was justiﬁed by

the

‘ordinary inquiries incident’ t0 a routine trafﬁc stop. After observing Branch running a red

light, [the

that

ofﬁcer]

was

entitled to detain

he was permitted to drive

[the]

Branch

in order to issue

Mercedes.”

him a citation and conﬁrm

Branch, 537 F.3d

at

338-39 (internal

citation omitted).3

3

E

also United States V. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 447 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Arango never
proved that he had lawful possession 0f the truck. Consequently, [the ofﬁcer] was justiﬁed
in detaining Arango while he tried to contact the registered 0wners.”)

The

of

facts

this

case are strikingly similar t0

Banh.

In both cases, law

enforcement stopped the driver for a routine trafﬁc Violation in a car that was not registered
to the driver.

Both drivers supplied law enforcement incomplete, inaccurate, or incorrect

information about the car’s registered owner.

owner

registered

to verify the driver’s claim that

Like the ofﬁcers in
order to issue

owner

that

And,

him

Banh,

in both cases, the ofﬁcer called the

he had permission t0 drive the vehicle.

Ofﬁcer Sessions was

entitled t0 temporarily detain

a citation for the trafﬁc Violation and to

Hale was permitted

t0 drive the car.

conﬁrm with

Hale in

the registered

Thus, verifying Hale’s claim that he had

the owner’s permission t0 drive the stopped car did not unlawfully extend the trafﬁc stop,

and the

district court

did not err

when

it

denied the motion to suppress.

Hale wrongly contends that “[V]erifying the driver’s permission from the owner

is

not akin to these routine checks for license, registration, and insurance” because “[u]n1ike
those checks, this veriﬁcation
(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

Whether an ofﬁcer decides
is

also

When

beyond the

it

is

entirely subjective

and beyond the driver’s control.”

Hale’s argument draws a distinction Without a difference.
t0 conduct other ordinary inquiries incident to the trafﬁc stop

driver’s control.

Hale has failed to show that the

district court erred

determined Ofﬁcer Sessions did not unlawfully extend the trafﬁc stop and denied

the motion t0 suppress.

D.

In

The

Alternative,

The Stop Was Justiﬁed BV Independent Reasonable Suspicion

Of Joyriding
Alternatively, although the district court did not decide the

this basis,

motion

t0 suppress

0n

Hale’s continued detention was justiﬁed by Ofﬁcer Session’s independent

reasonable suspicion that Hale was operating a motor vehicle Without the owner’s consent

10

LC.

(joyriding) in Violation

ﬁxed

moment

at the

The purpose 0f a

§ 49-227.4

the stop

is initiated,

is

not permanently

for during the course of the detention, there

evolve suspicion 0f criminality different from that Which
V.

trafﬁc stop

initially

prompted the

stop.

may

m

Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 984, 88 P.3d 1220, 1224 (Ct. App. 2003). “[A]ny routine trafﬁc

up suspicious circumstances, Which could

stop might turn

questions unrelated t0 the stop.

succeeding the stop

The ofﬁcer’s

an ofﬁcer asking

observations, general inquiries, and events

may—and often do—give rise to legitimate reasons for particular lines

0f inquiry and ﬁthher investigation by an ofﬁcer.” State

798 P.2d 453, 458

justify

(Ct.

V.

Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613,

App. 1990).

“If ofﬁcers acquire reasonable suspicion of other crimes during the course of a

trafﬁc investigation

415 P.3d

959

at

articulable facts

m,

.

(Ct.

.

they

may

investigate those crimes.” ReLeria, 163 Idaho at 550,

App. 2018).

146 Idaho 804, 81

m,

is

1,

4

The

was

issue

can be drawn from those facts.”

203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). Whether an ofﬁcer possessed

at

instinct

known

to the

983, 88 P.3d at 1223.

The reasonable suspicion standard
mere speculation or

that

evaluated based on the totality 0f the circumstances

139 Idaho

m

Reasonable suspicion must be based on speciﬁc,

and the rational inferences

reasonable suspicion
ofﬁcer.

.

on the

requires less than probable cause but

part of the ofﬁcer.

raised below, although

it

was not

more than

State V. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,

the basis of the district court’s decision.

During the motion to suppress hearing, defense counsel asked Ofﬁcer Sessions 0n crossexamination if he had a “reasonable basis to believe that there was other criminal activity
that was going on.” (TL, p.79, Ls.9-1 1.) Ofﬁcer Sessions responded, “With the totality of
Where he was at, Visiting a friend that was in Garden City with the registered
everything
owners in Boise, supposedly in Boise, for his registration
then yes, I believe that it’s
my duty to further my investigation and make sure that a citizen hasn’t just gotten their car
taken Without their permission if it was left outside running 0r something like that.” (TL,
.

.

.

.

p.79, Ls.16-25.)
11

.

.

483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999).

The reasonableness of

the suspicion

evaluated upon the totality 0f the circumstances at the time of the stop.

draw reasonable inferences from the

may be drawn from

facts in his 0r her possession,

Idaho Code section 49-227 makes

it

a

(Ct.

LC.

business parking lot at night.

Hale told Ofﬁcer Sessions

was

any person

t0 “operate a

intent temporarily to

When Ofﬁcer

§ 49-227.

was only occupied by Hale and was parked

it

registration

for

own, without the consent of the owner, and with

Sessions ﬁrst observed the car,

City,

had given him permission

m

and those inferences

App. 1988).

misdemeanor

deprive the owner of his possession 0f such vehicle.”

Garden

An ofﬁcer may

the ofﬁcer’s experience and law enforcement training.

Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085

vehicle, not his

I_d.

must be

that the owner,

t0 drive the car.

in a closed

who

lived in

Ofﬁcer Sessions’s

initial

check returned a Boise address associated With the registered owner, Which

inconsistent with the

just minutes before.

Garden City address

that

Hale had communicated

to the ofﬁcer

This inconsistency cast reasonable doubt in Ofﬁcer Sessions’s mind

about the veracity 0f Hale’s claims. Ofﬁcer Sessions reasonably inferred that Hale might
not actually know the car’s registered owner, and thus
the owner’s permission t0 operate the vehicle.

inferences

it

was

less likely that

he actually had

Given these circumstances and reasonable

drawn from the discovered inconsistency, reasonable suspicion of joyriding

arose and justiﬁed Ofﬁcer Sessions’s cursory investigation into Hale’s claim that he had

permission to drive the
that

car.

Because the time Ofﬁcer Sessions took

t0 verify Hale’s

claim

he had permission t0 drive the car was supported by reasonable suspicion, the duration

0f the trafﬁc stop was not unlawfully extended.
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Hale incorrectly argues that Ofﬁcer Sessions did not have reasonable suspicion that
Hale was operating the car Without the owner’s permission. (Appellant’s

According

to Hale, “the distinction

brief, pp. 14-15.)

between a Garden City address and a Boise address did

not give Ofﬁcer Sessions reasonable suspicion that criminal activity, such as theft or

joyriding,

was

afoot.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.15.)

Hale unconvincingly

relies

0n various

circumstances surrounding the stop in support of his argument. For example, he points to
his willingness to

answer questions, the

the registered owner, the fact that the car

matched the

fact that

he gave the ofﬁcer the correct name 0f

was not reported

stolen

and

that the

model 0f car

he did not appear to be under the inﬂuence 0f alcohol 0r

registration, that

otherwise impaired, and that he had a valid license and no outstanding warrants for his

arrest.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 1 5.) Although these circumstances

may factor into the totality

of the circumstances evaluation, they are not determinative nor do they negate other
circumstances

known

to

Ofﬁcer Sessions

at the

time 0f the stop.

Ofﬁcer Sessions possessed reasonable suspicion of criminality despite the

fact that

Hale answered the ofﬁcer’s questions willingly, gave the correct owner’s name, and the
car not being reported stolen.

Ofﬁcer Sessions knew

that

Hale had been loitering in a

closed business parking lot at approximately 9:00 p.m. in Garden City.

was the

sole occupant 0fthe vehicle,

and that he was not the registered owner 0fthe vehicle.

check revealed that the registered owner’s address was in Boise, which

The

registration

was

inconsistent With the information Hale

registered

He knew that Hale

owner resided

in

Garden

had provided the ofﬁcer. Hale had claimed the

City.

Based 0n

all

these circumstances, Ofﬁcer

Sessions had reasonable articulable suspicion ofj oyriding that justiﬁed a brief investigation
t0 verify Hale’s

now

suspect claim that he

knew

13

the registered

owner and had

the owner’s

permission to drive the

car.

Consequently, there was no legal basis upon which to suppress

the evidence.

In sum, Hale’s trafﬁc stop

justiﬁed

was not unlawfully prolonged.

by Ofﬁcer Sessions’s reasonable suspicion

Violation of trafﬁc laws. Verifying the

non-owner

that the car

The trafﬁc stop was

was being driven

driver’s claim that the registered

in

owner

gave them permission to drive was Within the scope of reasonable inquiries incident to the
trafﬁc stop.

Alternatively,

Ofﬁcer Session’s had independent reasonable suspicion of

joyriding that justiﬁed his continued detention 0f Hale While he veriﬁed Hale’s claim that

he had permission to drive the

car.

was not unlawfully prolonged

in

For these reasons, the duration of Hale’s trafﬁc stop
Violation 0f his

Fourth

Amendment

rights,

suppression was not warranted.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment of conviction.

DATED this 30th day of January, 2020.

/s/

Justin R. Porter

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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and

CERTEICATE OF SERVICE

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of January, 2020, served a true and
correct copy 0f the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
I

means of iCourt

File

and Serve:

JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Justin R. Porter

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
JRP/dd
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